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SENSING THE CONSTITUTION IN FEIST
David Lange*
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.' has invited analysis along many
lines of inquiry. In most instances, the practitioners and scholars who
have considered the case have brought to their work an admirable
pragmatism and focus for which one can be grateful.
Meanwhile, I intend to pursue a line of inquiry of my own - an
inquiry which is neither focused nor practical, at least not in any immediate sense, but which has been much on my mind since I first read
Feist last spring.
What I want to know is this: Is Feist just another in a long series
of false starts, missed opportunities, and wrong turns on the road to
constitutional harmonization in the field of intellectual property in
America? Or is it possible, as I think it may be, that what makes Feist
worthy of the close attention it is getting is that in this case, at last, the
Court has signalled its intention to begin the serious business of bringing to intellectual property the constitutional coherence it deserves? In
these remarks I will consider each of these alternatives briefly.
I.
Surely I need not dwell at length on false starts, missed opportunities or wrong turns. There can be few more remarkable chapters in the
saga of American constitutional law than the story of how we have
nurtured freedom of expression under the first amendment on the one
hand, even as we have tolerated the systematic suppression of expression under conventional intellectual property doctrines on the other. I
understand, of course, that the first amendment and intellectual property are to be taken as "reconciled;" for that matter, I have no difficulty reconciling them myself when I am obliged to do so. But then, I
have no difficulty believing six impossible things before breakfast ei-
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versity of Dayton's Scholarly Seminar on Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Ill
S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991), held in Dayton, Ohio, November 8-10, 1991.
1. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991).
2. Consider, for example, the "highly focused and practical analysis" by "leading private
practitioners, noted academics and affected industry leaders" assembled for a course on Feist
offered last December in Washington. The sponsor, Prentice Hall, promised to "cover all the bases" in a "timely seminar" on the "New Era of 'Fact' and Data Protection ... [under] Feist and
its Progeny .... " New Era of "Fact" and Data Protection . .. under] Feist and its Progeny,
PRENTICE HALL LAW & BUSINEss BROCHURE (Washington, D.C. Dec. 9, 1991).
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ther, when I must. And yet privately, like Alice, I know that what is is:

nonsense is nonsense; and it is nonsense to think that we can reconcile
the first amendment with intellectual property under existing doctrines.
We might as well try knitting vests with sleeves.'
Some day, we are going to have to take this conflict seriously.
Some day we will have to decide which we value more: our right to
express ourselves at will; or our right to possess, exclusively, those elements in our culture that once we shared with others, res communes.,
The one is consistent with our general right to think as we please and
speak as we think, a right which for centuries has served as the very
definition of public happiness. The other, I fear, is consistent with what
the sardonic Luis Bunuel once called "the discreet charm of the
bourgeoisie."
How could we have arrived at the new millennium without knowing what we think about these matters? I believe, at least partly, that
we have lived so spaciously until now that we have simply not confronted our neighbors: the fields within which authorship and self-expression lie are vast, and our reach has been less than our grasp. But
new technologies, newly intimate in our lives, have changed that. Now
we range where we please, seizing what comes to hand as we pass by.

3. The literature on the First Amendment/intellectual property conflict is extensive. A representative, and particularly good, recent piece (which collects much of the previous work on the
subject) is Fred Yen's reflection on the problems posed by the "total concept and feel" standard in
copyright. See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspectiveon the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989). For a still
more recent, equally excellent treatment, see also Copyright and Free Speech Rights, in L. RAY
PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 122-33 (1991).
4. Res communes, originally a concept in Roman law, seems an apt way to sum up the
essential nature of the public domain, which is what is at stake in this conflict. I owe my introduction to the phrase to two former students at the Duke Law School, Sanna Franklin and Judith
Sapp, who suggested it in the course of tutorial research some years ago.
The conflict between First Amendment values and cultural appropriation is especially problematic given the fact that most judges and intellectual property lawyers simply do not recognize
its existence in everyday settings. See generally Alfred C. Yen, supra note 3. In the course of an
especially powerful and sophisticated exploration of the issue of cultural appropriation via intellectual property doctrines, Rosemary Coombe observes: "Arguably, fewer and fewer defenses are
available in intellectual property infringement actions; free speech defenses are inconsistently interpreted and often dismissed without due consideration. More troubling, however, is the likelihood that freedom of expression arguments will not even be asserted." Rosemary J. Coombe,
Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1866-67 (1991). Coombe may think, as I do, that the First Amendment alone cannot be counted on as the instrument for constraining the development of intellectual property doctrines. See id. at 1876 n.133. For me it follows that we should pay more attention
to the development of the so-called "intellectual property clause" in the U.S. Constitution, and
especially to the constraints that clause implies-essentially as I believe Feist does. But Coombe,
meanwhile, writing as a Canadian scholar whose perspectives are both transnational and
postmodern, develops an intriguing Bakhtinian argument for constraint from within the intellechttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/6
tual property dialogue itself. See id.
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Consider our physical relationship with the text-any text. When I entered the practice of law not quite thirty years ago, the firm I joined
(then the oldest in the city) still possessed a letter press; there was no
Xerox machine; the IBM Correcting Selectric lay a few years ahead.
Today I interface and download what I want; I fax, scan, convert the
font, edit at will; I copy, add sound when I need to, delete frames, alter
scenes, format, aspect ratio. I am, in short, omnipresent in the text, and
I am accordingly an author of all I survey. No less so are we all. 5
Could we have anticipated our time in cases a century, or even a
generation, ago? I think we might have, in a case like Burrow-Giles

5. Or so I think, at any rate. Otheis disagree. Jessica Litman collects the literature and
sums up the controversy usefully in a recent article on the impact technology has had on copyright
legislation in the past decade or so. She writes:
Recent commentary reflects a dispute over whether the copyright statute can adjust to the
current climate of rapid technological change. One camp argues that current technology
differs profoundly from prior development and calls into question the assumptions on which
our copyright laws are based. Another camp insists that copyright law has always faced the
problem of technological change and accommodated it with remarkable success. The current challenge, the argument continues, is not qualitatively different from previous challenges, and the copyright statute is equal to the task.
Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275, 276
(1989) (citations omitted). Litman herself observes that "both camps rely heavily on received
wisdom about the history of the interaction between copyright and technology. Both, therefore,
proceed on the assumption that copyright law has been effective, until now, in assimilating technological development; in fact, it has not." Id. at 276-77 (citations omitted).
I am not a futurist, and I claim no special expertise in the subject of technology. Most of
what I think in this context is intuitive, rather than tutored. But I am firmly in the fin-de-siecle
"camp" for two reasons. First, because I sense in today's technology an intimacy which earlier
technologies simply do not seem to have achieved, as a matter of historical record. Second, because this intimacy is simply inconsistent, I think-inconsistent, that is to say, in terms I believe
to be deeply essential in human kind-with the capacity for forbearance from self-expression that
the continued existence of intellectual property as we have known it presupposes. Surely neither of
these insights is original with me, or at least I cannot imagine so; and I would welcome readers'
references to the work of others in which the points are better or more fully made.
Meanwhile, I have already speculated about the implications these insights hold for intellectual property in the postmodern millennium in an article soon to be published in another journal.
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
See David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word, Spring 1992).
Tom Palmer argues persuasively that intellectual property doctrines are themselves the consequence of specific technology, notably the press. He suggests in turn:
The relationship between intellectual property rights and technology poses a very important
question: If laws are dependent for their emergence and validation upon technological innovations, might not succeeding innovations require that those very laws pass back out of
existence? Today this question should be considered in the context of drastically lowered
costs of reproduction and transmission, increased costs of enforcement, problems arising
from indeterminate or collective authorship due to new applications of computer technology, and similar issues. One need not conclude from such considerations that copyright did
not emerge legitimately in a world of typography, but one should at least be led to question
whether it fulfills a legitimate role in a world of electronics.
Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property:A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMPublished
(1989).
L. eCommons,
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Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,8 in which the Court could have said something about the impact a new, visual technology surely would have on a
print-bound doctrine, but simply failed to grasp the implications in the
case-or perhaps, rather, failed merely to act on the insight it may
actually have had." I think we might have in Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.,8 in which Holmes, delphic as always, asked us to
imagine copying the original but not the copy, but failed himself to
imagine what that would mean in the landscape photography of Ansel
Adams. 9 I think we might have in Time, Inc., v. Bernard Geis Associates,1 0 in which the district court saw the case clearly enough in terms
of justification, but failed altogether to understand it in terms of simple
entitlement."
I think we might have anticipated our time in The Trade-Mark
Cases, 2 which distinguished trademarks from copyright in constitutional terms that justify us even now in having a second look at that
decision. Indeed, Justice O'Connor herself relies on The Trade-Mark
Cases in her opinion in Feist. And it is just here that we may begin to
sense possibilities in Feist more sweeping than we have encountered in
any other case before.

6.

111 U.S. 53 (1884).

7. It may be revealing of what Harry Kalven called "the insight more important than we
can use" that the best discussion of Burrow-Giles ever published actually appears in a new book of
critical cultural studies written by an English professor at Duke. See Photography Surprises the
Law: The Portrait of Oscar Wilde. in JANE GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE
VOICE, AND THE LAW 42-83 (1991).
.8.

188 U.S. 239 (1903).
9. Who but Adams, for example, can safely claim ownership in the moonrise above Hernandez, New Mexico, whether original or copy? Given the replicative capacity in photographic
technology, as well as the presumptions that arise in copyright from striking similarity, not to
mention the implications in derivative works theory, the answer is, no one can. In a very real
sense, at least since 4:05 p.m., Friday, October 31, 1941, the original has been imprisoned in the
copy. See ANSEL ADAMS, Moonrise, in EXAMPLES: THE MAKING OF 40 PHOTOGRAPHS 40-43
(1983).
10.

293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

11. Judge Thompson, the author in Geis, wasn't trying to copy protected expression. He
didn't want protected expression. In fact there was nothing he wanted less than the protected
expression, which was at best a distraction, and at worst a potential challenge to his theory. What
he wanted was the event, pure and simple. But, like the moonrise in Moonrise, the event was
imprisoned in the copy. Under Geis, he could hope for no better than the justification for a "taking" that fair use sometimes recognizes. Under Feist, extended, he might one day hope for the.
facts themselves as a matter of right, freed from the otherwise inextricable encumbrance of copyright by the very "thinness" of its embrace. Cf. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (interim ed. 1991).
12. .100 U.S. 82 (1879).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/6
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II.

When Justice O'Connor cites The Trade-Mark Cases, as she does,
passim, for the proposition that the "sweat of the brow" doctrine has
no constitutional place in the law of copyright, what exactly are we to
make of the point? In 1879, when The Trade-Mark Cases were decided, the distinction must have seemed clear: copyright was copyright,
and Congress was empowered to enact copyright legislation only when
the legislation comported with the standards contained within the
Copyright Clause; trademarks, meanwhile, were separate rights, and
whatever power Congress might draw upon to justify protecting trademarks, that power would have to be found somewhere other than
within the Copyright Clause. You may well remember the relevant language in The Trade-Mark Cases, but in any event here it is again from
the opinion by Mr. Justice Samuel Miller:
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or
discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the common law is generally
the growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention. It is often the result of accident rather than design, and when under
the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by registration, neither
originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way essential
to the right conferred by that act. If we should endeavor to classify it
under the head of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong.
In this, as in regard to inventions, originality is required. And while the
word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original,
and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which
are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the
form of books, prints, engravings, and the like. The trade-mark may be,
and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the
distinctive symbol of the party using it. At common law the exclusive
right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption. By the act of
Congress this exclusive right attaches upon registration. But in neither
case does it depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the
brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious
thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropriation. We look in
vain in the statute for any other qualification or condition. If the symbol,
however plain, simple, old, or well-known, has been first appropriated by
the claimant as his distinctive trade-mark, he may by registration secure
the right to its exclusive use. While such legislation may be a judicious
aid to the common law on the subjects of trade-marks, and may be
within the competency of legislatures whose general powers embrace that
we are unable to see any such power in the constituof subjects,1991
class
Published
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tional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and
13
discoveries.

Had I lived as a lawyer in 1879, I suppose I would have understood the distinctions entertained by Mr. Justice Miller in The TradeMark Cases, and I would have embraced them, I imagine, unhesitatingly. Even today, where copyright is concerned, the passage from the
opinion cited here is still strong-and not just strong, but profoundly
right as well. Indeed the opinion says very nearly all one would want to
hear said about copyright and the requirements of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution at the level of constitutional constraint.
Were we to add to this passage a few complementary, and equally
compelling, passages from Graham v. John Deere Co.," then we might
be tempted to imagine that we had all the jurisprudence we need for
our time-all the jurisprudence necessary, that is to say, for intellectual property in the post-modern, post-literate millennium.
But The Trade-Mark Cases are not about intellectual property;
they are merely about copyright and trademarks. And the distinctions
between these two doctrinal fields-so eminently sensible in 1879, and
so admirably delineated in that case-are now quite illusory in 1991.
Indeed, one actually has the sense, recalling these distinctions in Feist,
of somehow living before one's own time, more or less as though the
day's post had brought a long-delayed invitation to take the waters at
Marienbad. The problem with The Trade-Mark Cases today is simply
the problem Gertrude Stein encountered when she finally arrived in

13. Id. at 94.
14. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a specific
constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress "To promote the Progress of...
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their
• . . Discoveries." The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified
authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by
the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the "useful arts." It was
written against the backdrop of the practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies--of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses
which had long before been enjoyed by the public . . . . The Congress in the exercise of
the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain,
or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
which by constitutional command must "promote the Progress of.. . useful Arts." This is
the standardexpressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light
that patent validity "requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution."
Id.
at 5-6 (citations omitted). *
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/6
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Oakland: there is no there there. I wonder whether that may yet prove
to be the problem with Feist as well.
Of course it is too soon to know the answer to a question of that
character. It is not too soon, however, to sense what manner of influences will have shaped the answer when it finally becomes clear. Feist
will prove to be an empty precedent if it serves merely to reinforce
distinctions that seemed natural in The Trade-Mark Cases. The day is
past when distinctions like these can suffice. Formalist in' nature and
therefore essentially bereft of meaning today, constitutional distinctions
between trademarks and copyright, for example, now serve mainly to
obscure the appropriative nature of both doctrinal fields. We have
merely to observe how proponents of moral rights today seek sanctuary
in amendments to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to see in turn that
1879 distinctions have become the refuge of the cynical realists among
us. But the Constitution in our time should leave no room for such
cynicism. Congress is empowered to grant exclusive rights to authors
and inventors for limited times solely in order to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts. This is the constitutional standard, the
Court has said, and the standard constrains; its limits cannot properly
be avoided through the simple device of calling authorship (read: appropriation) by another name.
Feist will prove not to be an empty precedent only if the decision
in that case prompts us to reinscribe the outcome there in other settings
as well: to insist, in other words, that no interest, property-like in character, can ever be recognized under the constitution in any expression
that does not in fact meet the constitutional tests of originality and
creativity. To achieve that end we must also be willing to re-imagine
The Trade-Mark Cases themselves, as though they were to be transposed to our time. Feist prompts us to do exactly that. And if, in
prompting us to reconsider these matters, Feist should lead us finally to
realize that in an age of intellectual property we must be governed
under the Constitution-not by a copyright or patent clause but rather
by an intellectual property clause-then, most assuredly, Feist will not
be an empty precedent at all.
Is it realistic to suppose that Feist can take us in this direction?
Certainly not in terms of the immediate decision, nor much in terms of
the language immediate in the opinion. And yet I would insist that
there is reason to anticipate more from the case than meets the eye.
The key to understanding both the limits and the possibilities in
any precedent is, indeed, to see it in relation to its own time. The
Trade-Mark Cases exactly mirrored the times: there was, literally, no
occasion to go beyond the reach of the opinion there. Feist, too, can be
perfectly reflect
to eCommons,
said by
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that we cannot go on tolerating the appropriation of our culture that
aging precedents in the intellectual property field allow. 5 Feist was decided, I would say, precisely because the Court recognized an intolerable situation in the telephone directory cases, and a situation all the
more intolerable for the fact that it derived from doctrinal positions
nearly a century old.
The origins of whatever jurisprudence there may be in Feist, then,
do not lie finally in the Nineteenth century. They lie in such late Twentieth Century achievements as fiber optics and the microchip. So long
as these and scores of related technologies hold sway in our time, we
can expect the Court to respond with constitutional doctrines suited to
the need. And in this sense, then, Feist may well signal the beginning
of a new era of coherence in the constitutional law constraining intellectual property. 16

15. See generally GAINES, supra note 7; see also Coombe, supra note 4.
16. Compare the similar suggestion in a recent work by Howard Abrams. Howard Abrams,
Originality and Creativity in Copyright [After Feist], LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1992).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/6

